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ABSTRACT
Available resources can often be limited with regard
to the number of demands. In this paper we propose
an approach for solving this problem using the mech-
anisms of multi-item auctions for allocating the re-
sources to a set of software agents. We consider the re-
source allocation problem as a market with vendor and
buyer agents participating in a multi-item auction. The
agents exhibit different acquisition capabilities which
let them act differently depending on the current con-
text or situation of the market. We present a model for
this approach based on the English auction, and dis-
cuss experimental evidence of such a model.
1. INTRODUCTION
Agent technology is becoming one of the most impor-
tant and exciting areas of research and development in
computer science today. This technology is a signifi-
cant area of interest for such applications as telecom-
munications, information management and the Inter-
net, electronic commerce, computer games, interactive
cinema, information retrieval and filtering, user inter-
face design, industrial process control, open systems,
etc. The successful adoption of this technology in all
these areas will have a profound impact both on in-
dustry, and also on the way in which future computer
systems will be conceptualized and implemented.
Many applications, if not most of them, require mul-
tiple agents, called also multiagent systems (MAS). In
such systems, knowledge, action and control are dis-
tributed among the agents, which may cooperate, com-
pete or coexist depending on the context. MAS have
shown to be relevant [5] for understanding, imple-
menting and operating complex socio-technical sys-
tems as represented for example by e-business sys-
tems. In this paper we propose a model for multi-item
auctions which has a strong relationship to the efforts
in building multiagent systems.
Auctions have always been an important market mech-
anism. The work presented in this paper focuses on
the approach where auctions are considered as a pro-
cess of automatic negotiation applying the multiagent
paradigm. Negotiation is central to any commerce and
market. It can be defined as a Mechanism that allows
a recursive interaction between a principal and a re-
spondent in the resolution of a good deal [2].
An auction commonly restricts the negotiation vari-
ables essentially to the price and the quantity in case
of multiple items. An open auction allows the agent
to review his offers, and if the auction is public, to re-
fine them by analyzing the offers of other participants
and by considering the auction’s evolution. The ne-
gotiation strategy may thus be adapted according to
the rules of the market. Finally, an auction negoti-
ates a mutually acceptable solution for both the vendor
and the buyer while the market forces alone decide on
the negotiation termination. The use of auctions as a
mechanism for automatic negotiation and for resource
re-allocation in multiagent systems was demonstrated
by T. Sandholm [4, 3].
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
a model for multi-item auctions. The strategy and
equilibrium conditions of the auction process relying
on this model are presented and analyzed in Section 3.
Following that, Section 4 presents an implementation
of the model. The simulation results of three typical
cases are presented and discussed in Section 5. Fi-
nally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. A MULTI-ITEM AUCTION MODEL
2.1 Multi-item auctions
In may cases, auctions include multiple non-identical
items. The price that a bidder may offer for one item
may depend in complicated ways on what other items
it can get. In such cases, it is often preferable to allow
bids on combinations of items, as opposed to bids on
only single items. Such an auction is called ”combi-
natorial auction”. Bidding in combinatorial auctions
gives the possibility to bidders to submit offers on a
package of objects that interest them. For example,
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in a auction where computer components are sold, a
buyer may be interested in having a computer screen
with a central unit, but he is not interested in winning
only the screen. This type of auction is preferable here,
since it allows the bidders to express their true prefer-
ences, and may thus lead to better allocations. How-
ever, the exponential number of possible combinations
usually results in computational intractability in deal-
ing with such auctions.
Most work on multi-item auctions suppose two sim-
plifying conditions: the quantity of items to sell is
fixed as well as the quantities requested by the buyers.
These two hypothesis do not meet the requirements
of many situations where auctions are used. Leng-
weiler [1] for example proposes an auction model,
where the available quantity is not fixed. It can there-
fore change during the auction as it is for example the
case for stock values. The approach proposed in this
paper is inspired from Lengweiler’s model, and it is
based on an English auction with multiple items, pri-
vate evaluations and variable requested quantities. In
a simple English auction, bidders submit increasing
public offers to the auctioneer until no more bidder is
able or willing to submit a better bid. The winner is
the last participant who submitted the best bid.
2.2 Model
Consider a multi-item auction with one single vendor
and a finite number n of buyers or agents A
1
; : : : ; A
n
.
A quantity Q of identical items is available to be sold.
Each buyer A
i
wishes to acquire a quantity q
i
of items
with:
n
X
i=1
q
i
> Q
The evaluations V
i
; i = 1; : : : ; n of the n buyers
are extracted from a rectangular uniform distribution
F (V ) on the interval [V
min
; V
max
] where
V
max
  V
min
> 1
This defines a model of private, independent evalua-
tions. Given that F is rectangular and uniform, the fol-
lowing holds
F (V
i
) =
1
V
max
  V
min
Because the items are identical, each buyer A
i
has the
same evaluation v
i
for all the items it wants to acquire
such that
V
i
= (v
i
 q
i
)
The participants in the auction submit their offers as
if they would desire to acquire just one single item.
Their respective desired quantities q
i
are unknown to
the vendor. Let b
i
the function of submission offers
describing the auction strategy of buyer A
i
depending
on its evaluation V
i
and the desired quantity q
i
of the
item i:
b
i
= b(V
i
; q
i
); i = 1; : : : ; n
Note that the buyer may decide to decrease the desired
quantity during an auction in order to increase his eval-
uation of the item i according to
v
0
i
=
V
i
q
0
i
where v0
i
is the new evaluation of item i for buyer A
i
,
and q0
i
the new quantity desired with q 0
i
< q
i
.
Suppose for example that buyer A
i
has a global evalu-
ation V
i
= 100 for the desired items. If this buyer asks
for a quantity of items q
i
= 10, his evaluation for each
of them would be
v
i
=
V
i
q
i
=
100
10
= 10
If the buyer decides to decrease the quantity asked for
to q0
i
= 5 items, the evaluation v 0
i
is calculated as fol-
lows:
v
0
i
=
V
i
q
0
i
=
100
5
= 20
At the end of the auction, buyer A
i
receives q
i
items
such that:
q
i
= q
i
if Q 
P
b
j
>b
i
q
j
 q
i
q
i
= Q 
P
b
j
>b
i
q
j
if 0 < Q 
P
b
j
>b
i
q
j
< q
i
q
i
= 0 if Q 
P
b
j
>b
i
q
j
 0
In fact, winning bidders will obtain the quantities they
bid for, while the last winning bidder will obtain just
the remaining quantity. All loosing participants will
obtain a null quantity.
Indeed, the quantity q
i
obtained by buyer A
i
depends
on the demands of the other buyers A
j
having submit-
ted offers b
j
superior to his offer b
i
. The quantities of
those buyers is thus
X
b
j
>b
i
q
j
The last winning buyer A
i
may thus have his demand
partially satisfied by the remaining quantity not sold to
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the others. For example, suppose that 10 items are for
sale. The best offer for 8 of the items he desires is 15.
The second best offer is 10 for 5 items. The first buyer
will receive the 8 items he asked for, while the second
buyer will only receive 10  8 = 2 items.
The winning buyers pay the amount of their bids mul-
tiplied by the quantity obtained: b
i
 q
i
. Their respec-
tive gains are:
U
i
= (v
i
  b
i
) q
i
= V
i
  b
i
q
i
If the evaluation of the items to buy in the previous
example is 18 for the first winning buyer A
1
and 14
for the second one A
2
, their respective gains are:
A
1
: U
1
= (18  15) 8 = 24
A
2
: U
2
= (14  10) 2 = 8
The function of gain U
i
is called the utility of buyer
A
i
. Each buyer A
i
tries to maximize its utility U
i
.
3. STRATEGY AND EQUILIBRIUM
Every participant in the auction tries to win as if it
were a simple English auction. Because a partici-
pant does not know which are the quantities asked
for by the other participants, it may happen that his
bid will be out-done by other buyers. It is thus faced
with the risk that the demanded quantity q
i
will be
entirely allocated to another buyer offering a higher
price. The buyer is always faced with the dilemma
where he wants to minimise his bid b
i
to maximize his
gains, but where on the other hand it must take care
that his bid b
i
has the best chances to win. A winner’s
course strategy taking into account these two contra-
dicting constraint must therefor be defined.
Assume a buyer A
i
submits an offer b
i
. For this bid
to win, it is necessary that all the other n   1 bidders
submit inferior offers with regard to b
i
. The probabil-
ity that any offer b
j
is inferior to the offer b
i
knowing
that A
i
demands the quantity q
i
is:
P (b
j
< b
i
jq
i
) =
Z
q
i
;b
i
V
min
F (V )dV
with F (x) = 1
V
max
  V
min
resulting in:
P (b
j
< b
i
jq
i
) =
q
i
b
i
  V
min
V
max
  V
min
The probability that all offers of the other n 1 buyers
are inferior to b
i
is thus:
n 1
Y
1
q
i
b
i
  V
min
V
max
  V
min
=

q
i
b
i
  V
min
V
max
  V
min

n 1
All the buyers A
i
try to optimise their winning course
by maximizing the probability to win the auction. The
buyer therefor maximizes the following expression:
Y
i
(V
i
  q
i
b
i
)

q
i
b
i
  V
min
V
max
  V
min

n 1
The following expression is now resolved:
@
Y
i
=@b
i
= 0
This results in
 q
i
(q
i
b
i
  V
min
)
n 1
+
(V
i
  q
i
b
i
)(n  1)q
i
(q
i
b
i
  V
min
)
n 2
= 0
which yields after factorisation in
q
i
(q
i
b
i
  V
min
)
n 2

[ (q
i
b
i
  V
min
) + (V
i
  q
i
b
i
)  (n  1)] = 0
Keeping only the solutions which maximize
Q
i
:
(q
i
b
i
  V
min
) + (q
i
b
i
  V
i
)(n  1) = 0
the result is
^
b
i
=
V
min
+ (n  1)V
i
nq
i
The expression ^b
i
represents the optimal offer of buyer
A
i
in the sense that it is the minimal offer maximizing
the probability to win the auction, while assuming that
the evaluations of the other bidders are uniformly dis-
tributed.
3
4. SIMULATION
The model presented in the previous section has been
implemented as a simulation platform based on the
multiagent paradigm. There are multiple buyer agents
and a vendor agent. The application was entirely
coded in Java, because of the portability, robustness
and simplicity of this programming language. The
agents were implemented as Java threads running on
a local machine. The program offers the possibility to
define the number of items to sell by the vendor agent,
the minimum bid increment and the reservation price
as well. Then, we have the possibility to characterise
the buyer agents through the definition of their num-
ber and the amount of money allowed to them. We
may choose to randomly generate buyer agents bid-
ding strategies, or fix them manually. Finally, the auc-
tion may be run. All the agent characteristics may
be loaded from/saved to a file, and similarly for the
bids generated by the buyers through the auction exe-
cution. Those results are then inspected and analysed
in order to induce some empirical conclusions. The
simulations were made on a Pentium III PC with 128
Meg of RAM. The auction simulation process execu-
tion time depends essentially on the number of buyer
agents and the minimum bid increment value. Never-
theless, an auction simulation doesn’t take more than
approximately 5 to 10 seconds on such a machine.
This auction duration is a mean estimation based on
the simulations we made. Those simulations included
from 5 to 30 buyer agents.
4.1 Vendor agent
The vendor agent supervises the auction process in a
central manner. It engages the auction by announcing
its start to the buyers and then expects offers from the
buyer agents. Each time the vendor receives an offer,
it announces it to the buyers as the current best offer
without revealing the buyer’s identity nor the quantity
asked for. The vendor agent knows the number n of
buyers participating in the auction. If a buyer leaves
the auction, it decrements the number n of participat-
ing buyer agents. When only one buyer is left, the
vendor agent announces the end of the auction.
The vendor agent can be considered as a reactive agent
which reacts to exterior stimuli, i.e. the messages ar-
riving from the buyer agents A
i
. It interacts with the
environment by sending messages to the buyers as de-
scribed above.
4.2 Buyer agent
The behavior of the buyer agent is defined by his win-
ning course strategy as discussed in Section 3.. The
strategy for maximizing the buyer’s gain is fixed in ad-
vance.
4.2.1 Enrichment strategy
While bidding, the buyer agent must take a decision
on: (1) the offer to submit and (2) the decrease of the
quantity demanded. There are thus two parameters to
be set for choosing the enrichment strategy: (1) how
and when to place an offer, and (2) how and when to
decrease the quantity asked for.
The enrichment strategy of the buyer agent is modelled
with two linear functions, which represent a more or a
less aggressive behavior:
1. price offered as a function of time, during the auc-
tion progress, as illustrated in Figure 1.
2. quantity asked for as a function of time, during
the auction progress as illustrated in Figure 2.
Un
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Time : Auction Evolution
Not AggressiveAggressive LessAggressive
Maximum price
Figure 1: Price offered during the auction’s progress.
N
e
e
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a
n
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Time : Auction Evolution
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Initial Needed Quantity
Minima Needed Quantity
Figure 2: Quantity demanded during the auction’s progress.
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4.2.2 Behavior of the buyer agent
When a buyer agent starts to participate in an auc-
tion, it first determines the time interval of inactivity
according to its enrichment strategy. At the end of this
waiting period, the agent verifies the current price. If
his offer is still the winning one, i.e. no other buyer
agent has submitted a superior offer during its time of
inactivity, he determines his new waiting time accord-
ing to his enrichment strategy. The buyer agent con-
tinues this process until another buyer has submitted a
better offer. At this time, the buyer agent starts a pro-
cess of enrichment in order to submit a superior offer.
If it can submit a better offer, the buyer agent sends a
message to the vendor agent with his price offer and
the quantity desired.
In case the buyer cannot submit a better offer, he tries
to decrease his quantity. The buyer agent seeks to di-
minish the quantity asked for according to his strategy,
i.e. more or less aggressively. As long as he cannot
make a better offer, he continues to decrease the quan-
tity. If the agent achieves his goal, it submits the new
offer, otherwise it abandons the auction.
Finally, when the auction will be terminated, the buyer
agent receives a signal from the vendor agent and then
clears the auction. The winner will receive a message
from the vendor indicating the price and quantity won.
It has to be noted here, that there may be more than
one winner, each acquiring a different quantity as il-
lustrated in the example in Section 2.2.
5. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
This section presents and discusses empirical results
obtained by the simulation of the model described in
this paper. Three different cases are evaluated.
Case 1: Same needs and same evaluations
Suppose there are 10 items to sell and n = 5 buyer
agents. All the buyers A
1:::5
dispose of the same
amount of money to spend (V
i
= V
min
= V
max
; 1 
i  5). The initial quantity each buyer A
i
asks for
is equal to 10 items (q
i
= 10; 1  i  5), and the
minimal quantity accepted by the vendor agent shall
be 6 items. The strategies of the buyers are randomly
generated.
This scenario represent a case of aggressive competi-
tion because all the buyers show the same (or similar)
needs for the quantities desired and their evaluations
of the items are the same as well. One can thus expect
that the buyers will heavily decrease their quantity de-
mands in order to win the auction. The revenue of the
vendor is in this case not affected by the number of
buyer agents. Indeed, the following equation holds:
^
b
i
=
V + (n  1)V
nq
i
=
V
q
i
= v
i
The optimal offer for each buyer agent is therefore his
own evaluation v
i
of the item.
Figure 3 first shows the revenue of the vendor depend-
ing on the means the buyers dispose, i.e. the buy-
ers’ evaluations, without any decrease of the requested
quantities. Second, the figure presents the vendor’s
revenue in case the desired quantities are decremented
down to a minimum of 6 items.
Figure 3: Vendor revenue in case of heavy competition.
Case 2: Same needs but different evalu-
ations: influence of the number of buyer
agents
Suppose the same parameters as in Case 1 except that
the buyer agents have different evaluations, i.e. they
dispose of different amounts of money to spend. The
evaluations of the 5 buyers are determined according
to a uniform distribution with V
min
= 100 and V
max
=
300.
The competition is not as aggressive as in Case 1.
Along the auction, the agents with smaller evaluations
will abandon. In the end only two agents will stay and
compete to win the auction.
Figure 4 shows the influence of the number of buyer
agents on the revenue of the vendor. The model pre-
sented in this paper allows to considerably increase the
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mean revenue of the vendor. In order to maximize his
revenue, the vendor should attract a large number of
buyers. In case there is no decrease in the quantity
requested, the revenue of the vendor stabilized with
20 buyers and more. The revenue stabilisation oc-
curs later with the possibility to decrement the desired
quantity. Figure 4 shows that this happens only with
40 and more buyers. This difference can be explained
by the competition which is always more accentuated
compared to a model where the requested quantities
do not decrease.
250
300
350
400
450
500
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
mean income
maximum theroretical income
income without quantity decrease
number of buyers
mean seller income
Figure 4: Vendor revenue in relation to the number of buy-
ers.
Case 3: Same needs but different evalua-
tions: influence of the minimal offer
The parameters are the same as in Case 2 except that
the number of buyer agents is fixed to 10. The vendor
may define a minimal incremental value for an offer.
While increasing this minimal incrementation value,
the number of offers is decreased, which in turn min-
imises the communications between the buyers and
the vendor. The simulation experiments have shown
that a large incrementation value results in a globally
decreasing mean revenue for the vendor. Figure 5
presents this correlation. The curve representing this
relation shows however, that there are certain incre-
mentation values allowing better revenues than smaller
ones. Indeed, the curve has a wave form with increas-
ing period. For example, the minimal incrementation
value of 10 generates superior revenues compared to
the incrementation values of 8 and 9. This behavior
depends of the function determining the evaluations of
the buyers. Given that V
max
= 300 in the current ex-
ample, the maximal offer a buyer with an evaluation
of v
i
= 300 can make to obtain the 6 items (minimal
number of requested items) will be 50 per item. If the
minimal incrementation is set to 9, the maximal offer
per item will be 45. On the other hand, if the minimal
increment value is 10, the maximal value of 50 to offer
per item can be achieved. This explains the wave form
of the curve in Figure 5.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0 5 10 15 20 25
mean unitary income
number of bids
minimum bid incrementing
Figure 5: Vendor revenue and number of bids in relation to
the minimal bid increment value.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a formal model for auction
based automatic negotiations. This model has been
implemented using MAS and was tested and evaluated
with experiments. Recently, most work on multi-item
auctions have addressed the combinatorial issue that
allows bids on combinations of items as opposed to
only single items. These approaches suppose however,
two simplifying conditions: the quantity of items to
sell is fixed as well as the quantities requested by the
buyers. These two hypothesis do not meet the require-
ments of many situations where auctions are used. In
some auctions, it is more desirable to not fix the avail-
able quantity. It this way, quantities can change dur-
ing the auction, as it is for example the case for stock
values. The approach that we have proposed here, fol-
lows this road. To achieve it, we presented a model
based on an English auction with multiple items with
private evaluations and variable quantities requested.
With such a model, we succeed in characterizing:
1. How a large incrementation value results in a
globally decreasing mean revenue for the vendor;
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2. How an augmentation of the incrementation
value (by the vendor) decreases the number of
offers, which in turn minimises the communica-
tions between buyers and the vendor;
3. How the vendor’s revenue stabilizes with 20 buy-
ers and more in the case where there is no de-
crease in the quantity requested, and with 40 buy-
ers or more when a decrease of the requested
quantity is considered;
4. How the vendor’s revenue increases with large
quantity variations in the quantities requested;
5. Finally, the implementation using multiagent sys-
tems showed the suitability of this paradigm for
this application.
In conclusion, we believe that our model for automatic
negotiations is a suitable approach to enhance the ca-
pabilities of auction systems while imposing less con-
straints. In future work, we will investigate other en-
richment strategies as well as experiment with other
types of auctions. Given the first experimental results
of this paper we expect to successfully demonstrate the
power of this model with such variations as well.
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